Compared with its ASEAN neighbors, Vietnam appears to have weathered the Asian crisis quite well. Official statistics indicate a GDP growth rate of 6.6 per cent for the first half of 1998; export growth remains positive, and the dong has depreciated by only 20 per cent against the USD. But the relatively favorable picture has more to do with controls than with sound economic fundamentals. In the absence of comprehensive reforms, the Vietnamese economy will gradually slide into a deeper recession. Influential interest groups, such as SOEs and their employees, hanker after a return to central planning. What is needed instead is a Doi Moi II, including measures to liberalize trade, strengthen the financial system and promote transparency throughout the economy.
and improved international relations have been accompanied by improvements in many social indicators. Poverty was reduced by a third during the first ten years of doi moi, various health services have become more generally available, an increasing share of the population has access to safe water and sanitation, and primary school enrolment rates have been rising (UNDP 1996) .
However, even before the advent of the Asian crisis in July 1997, it had become apparent that it might not be possible to sustain the high growth rate without further reforms. The reason was that serious structural weaknesses had begun to endanger the stability of the economy.
The problems included inefficient SOEs and banks, growing current account deficits, and a trade policy bias in favor of import substitution. The development of the private sector was also obstructed by unclear rules, often favoring SOEs, excessive red tape, and corruption.
Weak SOEs
One of the main problem areas was the weak development of the SOE sector, which accounted for more than half of industrial output and about a third of GDP. Most SOEs were reported to operate with obsolete machinery and equipment, with low productivity and quality as a result. The rate of overemployment in 1996 was estimated at 25 percent. This translated into weak financial performance. The majority of the approximately 6,000 SOEs were barely breaking even, and it was estimated that 300 enterprises accounted for 80 percent of the SOE sector's contributions to the state budget. Due to their low profitability, many SOEs were forced to borrow capital from other state enterprises, the banking sector, and other capital sources, which created a complex maze of cross-subsidization and indebtedness. There are no reliable data on the aggregate debt of the SOE sector -in fact, Tu (1997) argues that the government itself does not have detailed knowledge of the financial situation of SOEs -but it is likely that many firm are technically bankrupt. In addition to domestic debt, some SOEs had been able to borrow in the international market, contributing to the country's growing external debt. At the end of 1996, the external debt in convertible currencies stood at about USD 8.3 billion, or 35 percent of GDP.
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Fragile financial sector
The debt problems of the SOEs were not only a potential burden for the state budget, but they also weighed heavily on an already fragile financial sector. Although the banking sector comprised around 80 commercial banks in 1996, most were small and the four largest stateowned banks accounted for over 75 percent of assets and credits. Their operations were not only based on commercial decisions, but political objectives were also important. SOEs enjoyed various privileges, such as easier access to foreign currency loans, subsidized interest rates, and less stringent collateral requirements than private firms. Consequently, more than half of the banking systems' aggregate lending was directed to SOEs, and the banks were heavily exposed to the weaknesses of the SOEs.
In addition, because of their limited experience with market-based financial transactions, the banks were vulnerable to the kind of moral hazard problems that have plagued other Asian countries in recent years. Leung and Doanh (1998) suggest that the "mini" financial crisis of 1996-97 provides a good illustration of these weaknesses. In 1996, lending restrictions were liberalized and state-owned commercial banks were allowed to start issuing letters of credit to finance the international trade transactions of SOEs. In practice, this was equivalent to increasing the short term lending of foreign currencies. The total amount of outstanding letters of credit grew to about 7.5 percent of GDP (over USD 1.5 billion) by the beginning of 1997.
However, instead of using the credits for trade financing, a number of SOEs channeled the funds into real estate investments and other speculative uses.
Many of these investments failed, and an estimated 40 percent of the guaranteed letters of credit had become bad loans in early 1997. Several commercial banks defaulted on their letters of credit, which eventually necessitated a costly State Bank rescue operation that reduced the country's international reserves significantly. Another consequence was a downgrading of Vietnam's sovereign credit rating from Ba3 to C. By September 1997, before any real impact of the regional crisis had yet been felt, the overdue debts of Vietnamese banks had thus grown to 12.7 percent of their total lending, corresponding to over 100 percent of their capital and reserves (IMF 1998) . The Vietnamese authorities responded by introducing various controls to avoid similar credit expansions in the future. Yet, serious problems remain. It is likely that the banking system is in a worse condition than what its financial statements indicate (IMF 1998) .
A large trade deficit
The development in the trade sector provided another reason for worry. Although exports had grown at an average annual rate of nearly 30 percent between 1991 and 1996, imports had increased even faster, with widening trade and current account deficits as a result. The trade deficit exceeded 10 percent of GDP already in 1994, and grew to about 15 percent of GDP in 1996. Although most developing countries can be expected to incur significant deficits because of the need to import machinery, equipment, and intermediate products for the emerging industrial sector, it was obvious to everybody that imbalances of this magnitude could not be sustained for very long.
The acute problems concerned the financing of the deficit. Until 1996, it had appeared easy to finance the import surplus, since optimistic expectations about the future of the Vietnamese economy had generated large inflows of foreign assets in the form of official development assistance (ODA), private transfers, and FDI. However, the situation started to deteriorate in 1996. The growth in FDI inflows stagnated, and it was necessary to finance a large share of the current account deficit with increased borrowing. The disbursement of medium and long term loans almost doubled between 1995 and 1996, the rapid expansion in the amount of outstanding letters of credit discussed above provided easy -but temporary -short term financing, and arrears on scheduled repayments began to accumulate.
2 At the beginning of 1997, it was understood that a serious balance-of-payments (BoP) crisis could emerge unless the current account deficit was contained.
The response was a very severe tightening of import controls. Strict quantitative restrictions and temporary import prohibitions were introduced to limit imports of consumer goods (including cars, motorcycles, bicycles, beverages, sugar, and confectioneries) and commodities such as cement, glass, paper, and steel. Apart from reducing the import surplus, it appears that the import bans also aimed to help local firms, mainly joint ventures and affiliates of foreign multinationals, reduce their large inventories (CIEM 1998 , IMF 1998 . In addition to formal trade policy measures, currency controls were also used to curb imports.
Firms were obliged to deposit their foreign exchange earnings in designated commercial banks, and the allocation of foreign exchange to potential importers was subject to a licensing procedure managed by the State Bank. Export oriented companies and "strategic" SOEs and foreign investors had privileged access to foreign exchange (although foreign investors were obliged to be self-sufficient in foreign currency), but the imports of all other companies were easily controlled through the licensing system. For instance, restrictions in the allocation of foreign currency and letters of credit were among the main instruments used to uphold the "consumer goods import restriction list" announced in February 1997. 3 This way, import growth was restricted to only a few percent in 1997. Since exports continued growing at a rate of about 20 percent, the trade deficit shrank to between 8 and 10 percent. 4 However, the severe trade restrictions undermined investor confidence. For instance, there was a 50 percent drop in applications for FDI licenses in 1997.
Bias in favor of import substitution
The external imbalances also focused attention on the Vietnamese trade regime. Several studies pointed out that the large trade deficit was related to the heavy policy bias in favor of import substitution, and that it would be difficult to sustain the high growth rate unless significant trade reforms were undertaken (CIE 1997 , Kokko 1997 , UNDP 1996 . Import substitution was claimed to contribute to the trade deficit in two ways. First, the policy requires continuous and large imports of technology, equipment, and intermediates. Second, it distorts relative prices (often including the exchange rate) and discourages export production.
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Apart from the standard arguments against sinking scarce funds into capital-intensive projects in industries without comparative advantages, the studies also pointed to the political risks 
Developments during the Crisis
The Vietnamese economy was obviously under considerable pressure already before the outbreak of the Asian crisis in July 1997. The most acute problem was the exceedingly large current account deficit, which had made it necessary to tighten import controls. The problems 4 The imprecise figure on the trade deficit motivates a comment on the lack of transparency. Reliable data on economic fundamentals are hard to come by, although newspapers and government reports overflow with seemingly precise statistics. One problem that data from various sources are seldom consistent. For instance, in collecting information for this paper, the author received half a dozen different estimates of aggregate 1997 exports and imports from different ministries. Another problem is that some information -e.g. details on the government budget -is not published. It is indicative that Vietnam is one of the few countries that do not report regularly to the IMF's International Financial Statistics. This is not only confusing for foreign observers trying to understand the Vietnamese economy, but it also complicates decision making at various levels of the Vietnamese economy. It is hardly necessary to add a caveat about data quality. 5 Large export revenues are essential for the financing of import substituting industry. The bias against exports therefore necessitates special export promotion programs, fiscal incentives, export processing zones, and other measures to overcome the price distortions.
in SOEs and the banking sector were also serious, but not yet acute. In the absence of comprehensive reforms, it is likely that these problems would eventually have caused a serious homemade economic crisis. The turbulence in Asia has worsened the domestic weaknesses, and will speed up the onset of this crisis. It is easy to foresee that the large devaluations in the region will reduce the demand for Vietnamese exports and increase the pressure on the trade balance. When export performance turns out to be weaker than expected, some firms will be forced to cut back production and employment, reducing the overall growth rate of the economy. The scarcity of foreign exchange will limit the imports of machinery and intermediates for firms producing for the local market. Many companies will be unable to service their debts, worsening the problems for the banking sector as well.
However, the full force of the crisis has not hit Vietnam yet, and the most visible effects of the regional contagion may still appear relatively innocuous. The export growth rate is dropping but remains positive, FDI inflows and applications for new FDI licenses are down, and the Vietnamese dong has lost some of its value. At the same time, there are also some signs of the more serious consequences. Unemployment and inflation are on the rise, and growth is slowing. The official growth target for 1998 has been reduced from 9 percent to 6-7 percent.
Lower export growth
The estimates for the export growth rate for the first half of 1998 lie in the range 5-10 percent, with the lower bound as the more realistic figure. Although this is significantly below the 30 percent recorded in 1996 and the 20 percent achieved in 1997, it must still be considered as reasonably good. The purchasing power of Vietnam's Asian customers has fallen and the world market prices for important export commodities, such as crude oil and rice, have been sliding. Much of the growth is accounted for by firms with foreign investment -the sector with foreign capital increased its exports by over 35 percent compared to the same period the previous year (Tu et al. 1998) . 6 The gradual depreciation of the Vietnamese dong, which will be discussed below, has also encouraged the export sector. Moreover, Vietnam has been successful in redirecting exports from Asia to the rest of the world. Asia accounted for twothirds of Vietnamese exports in 1997, but only half during the first six months of 1998 ). However, it is possible that the continuing export growth is only temporary. It will be more difficult for Vietnamese exporters to retain their market shares once their Asian competitors recover from the crisis.
Continuing pressure on the BoP
The . 7 In fact, reports in the international press suggest that many foreign investors are scaling down their operations or closing altogether. For instance, in the first two months of 1998, 176 representative offices in Ho Chi Minh City were closed (Marshall 1998a) . In this tougher environment, it will probably be more difficult to manage an 8 percent current account deficit than it was to finance the 11-12 percent deficit recorded in 1996.
Dong depreciation
One indication of the increasing pressure on the BoP is the gradual depreciation of the Vietnamese dong since the first quarter of 1997. At that time, the target exchange rate was 11,175 dong per dollar, with a narrow fluctuation band of only +/-1 percent. The band was widened to 5 percent in March 1997 and further to 10 percent in October 1997. Since the market rate immediately moved to the upper end of the band, these adjustments constituted de 6 The export share of foreign affiliates and joint ventures during the first half of 1998 was 22 percent, according to Tu et al. (1998) . 7 Excluding one single large tourist project in Dalat, which is not likely to be realized in the near future, the decline in FDI licenses compared to the first half of 1997 is closer to 60 percent (Dapice 1998) . In comparison with the first half of 1996, the decline is nearly 90 percent.
expected to be more important in the future. Firms with foreign investment have managed to expand their output and exports more than twice as fast as domestic Vietnamese companies, and they have also been instrumental in introducing new technologies to Vietnam.
The problems mentioned above have not only hurt overall growth, but have also been felt by the government as well as in individual firms. Government budget revenues will fall short of the plan, which has already led to the postponement of several large infrastructure projects (Keenan 1998) . The budget deficit is still likely to increase from the approximately 3 percent recorded in 1997. Between a third and half of all SOEs were believed to be making losses during the first quarter of 1998, compared to an estimated 10 percent in 1995 (Tu et al. 1998 ).
The situation for foreign investors is equally bad. Firms producing low-end consumer goods for export to the region have largely lost their markets, and few of the heavy import substituting projects in industries such as automobiles, cement, steel, and sugar refining are even close to breaking even. Foreign investors in the hotel sector suffer from low occupancy and significantly lower room rates. The gut reaction, both among SOEs and local firms, has been to cut production and employment. As noted earlier, many foreign investors have also left the country.
Official data suggest that the overall unemployment rate in Vietnam is only about 6 percent, with 10-11 percent in the main cities. The real figures are probably far higher. In April,
Vietnam News Agency reported that 8 percent of the approximately 1,8 million workers in SOEs had been laid off, while unemployment in companies with foreign investment reached 11 percent. In September, press reports suggested that many SOEs were cutting 20-25 percent of their work force (Marshall 1998b) . These figures, albeit dramatic, are reasonably credible considering the overstaffing in SOEs -it is estimated that between a quarter and a half of the employees in SOEs are not meaningfully employed (Marshall 1998b , CIEM 1998 . In addition, underemployment in rural areas is probably close to 30 percent (CIEM 1998). With around 600,000 new entrants into the labor force every year, it is clear that further reductions in economic growth and a tighter labor market may cause very severe problems.
ways of using large amounts of illegally obtained foreign exchange without attracting the attention of the authorities, due to the comprehensive import restrictions.
And Then: Stagnation or Reform?
As long as Vietnamese markets remain strictly regulated, a sudden economic collapse comparable to what we have seen elsewhere in the region is unlikely. In the absence of comprehensive reforms, it is instead likely that the Vietnamese economy will gradually slide into a deeper recession. The policy responses that have been seen so far -the gradual depreciation of the dong, a cautious privatization of some small and medium-sized SOEs, microeconomic measures to promote inward FDI and exports, and a program to encourage restructuring of joint stock banks -will not be sufficient to halt the slide.
However, the increasingly severe real effects, in terms of lower growth rates and higher unemployment, will eventually force a stronger response. As long as the economy was growing at a healthy rate, Vietnam managed to combine a totalitarian regime with reasonable political stability, in spite of economic liberalization and increasing influences from the rest of the world. Given the low average income level, the population was willing to give up claims to democracy, free speech, and other "Western excesses" as long as the Vietnamese variant of market socialism delivered what it promised -a higher standard of living. Without growth, but with increasing unemployment and poverty, political stability may be at risk. Since political stability is a central objective of the Vietnamese leadership, this will ultimately prompt a more radical reaction. Two scenarios seem possible: either a return to stricter government control over the economy and tougher political repression, or a new round of economic reforms, a doi moi II. It is important to note that a return to the situation before 1997, with ambitious development objectives and import substitution, is probably not possible even after the Asian crisis has blown over a few years from now. The tougher competition for FDI and export shares from Vietnam's ASEAN neighbors -who will have devalued their currencies and restructured their economies by that time -will simply make it more difficult to finance import substitution.
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The scenario based on a return to central planning and political isolation is hopefully the less likely one, but it might be preferred by influential interest groups, such as SOEs and their employees. It is not desirable, because historical and international experience suggests that the opportunity cost, in terms of foregone growth opportunities, is significant. Moreover, although many countries have managed to uphold inward oriented command economies for
